was no better seaman in the world’ than the American, who ’had been bred to his work from infancy.’  A large proportion of the population ’was engaged in sea-going pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them.’[46] Having little or no naval protection, the American seaman had to defend himself in many circumstances, and was compelled to familiarise himself with the use of arms.  The men who passed through this practical, and therefore supremely excellent, training school were numerous.  Very many had been trained in English men-of-war, and some in French ships.  The state navy which they were called on to man was small; and therefore its personnel, though without any regular or avowed selection, was virtually and in the highest sense a picked body.  The lesson of the war of 1812 should be learned by Englishmen of the present day, when a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical superiority, in the mere possession of heavier materiel, and in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, which confidence, as experience has shown, is too often the forerunner of misfortune.  It is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimise the American successes.  Certainly they have been exaggerated by Americans and even by ourselves.  To take the frigate actions alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention, we see that the captures in action amounted to three on each side, the proportionate loss to our opponents, considering the smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than ours.  We also see that no British frigate was taken after the first seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years, and that no British frigate succumbed except to admittedly superior force.  Attempts have been made to spread a belief that our reverses were due to nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of our enemy’s ships.  It is now established that the superiority in these details, which the Americans certainly enjoyed, was not great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories.  Of course, if superiority in mere materiel, beyond a certain well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants, his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged that size of ship or calibre of guns—­greater within reasonable limits than we had—­necessarily led to the defeat of British ships by the French or Spaniards.  In the words of Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, ’The ships of the United States constantly fought with the chances in their favour.’  All this is indisputable.  Nevertheless we ought to see to it that in any future war our sea-power, great as it may be, does not receive shocks like those that it unquestionably did receive in 1812.

[Footnote 46:  NavalWar_of_1812_, 3rd ed. pp. 29, 30.]

SEA-POWER IN RECENT TIMES