In the defence of the British Empire the fleet holds a twofold position.  To its general belligerent efficiency, its strength and activity, we must look if the plans of an enemy are to be brought to nought.  It, and it only, can secure for us the control of the ocean communications, on the freedom of which from serious interruptions the prosperity—­indeed, the existence—­of a scattered body must depend.  In time of peace it can be made a great consolidating force, fostering every sentiment of worthy local patriotism whilst obliterating all inclination to mischievous narrow particularism, and tending to perfect the unity which gives virtue to national grandeur and is the true secret of national independence and strength.

XI

NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR[91]

[Footnote 91:  Written in 1905. (Read at Institute of Naval Architects.)]

The subject on which I have been invited to read a paper, and which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be expected to allot to it.  To discuss it adequately, a volume of no diminutive size would be necessary.  It may, however, be possible to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration certain points which, over and above their historical interest, may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day.

In taking account of the conditions of the Trafalgar epoch we have to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters.  These are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted to meet it by the British.  The former of these was described in the House of Commons by William Pitt at the beginning of the war in words which may be used without change at the present time.  On 16th May 1803 the war, which had been interrupted by the unstable Peace of Amiens, was definitely resumed.  The struggle was now to be a war not so much between the United Kingdom and the French nation as between the United Kingdom and the great Napoleon, wielding more than the resources of France alone.  Speaking a week after the declaration of war, Pitt said that any expectation of success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of the country by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and protracted war.  More briefly stated, the hostile plan was to invade the United Kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the East, from which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived.  The plan was comprehensive, but not easily concealed.  What we had to do was to prevent the invasion of the United Kingdom and defend our