In forming a true conception of what Nelson was, the
publications of the Navy Records Society will help
us greatly. There is something very remarkable
in the way in which Mr. Gutteridge’s volume[82]
not only confirms Captain Mahan’s refutation
of the aspersions on Nelson’s honour and humanity,
but also establishes Professor Laughton’s conclusions,
reached many years ago, that it was the orders given
to him, and not his amour, which detained him at Naples
at a well-known epoch. The last volume issued
by the Society, that of Mr. Julian Corbett,[83] is,
I venture to affirm, the most useful to naval officers
that has yet appeared among the Society’s publications.
It will provide them with an admirable historical
introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly
help them in ascertaining the importance of Nelson’s
achievements as a tactician. For my own part,
I may say with gratitude that but for Mr. Corbett’s
valuable work I could not have completed this appreciation.
The most renowned of Nelson’s achievements was
that performed in his final battle and victory.
Strange as it may seem, that celebrated performance
has been the subject of much controversy, and, brilliant
as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been freely,
and indeed unfavourably, criticised. There is
still much difference of opinion as to the preliminary
movements, and as to the exact method by which Nelson’s
attack was made. It has been often asserted that
the method really followed was not that which Nelson
had expressly declared his intention of adopting.
The question raised concerning this is a difficult
one, and, until the appearance of Mr. Julian Corbett’s
recent work and the interesting volume on Trafalgar
lately published by Mr. H. Newbolt, had not been fully
discussed. The late Vice-Admiral P. H. Colomb
contributed to the UnitedService_Magazine_ of
September 1899 a very striking article on the subject
of Nelson’s tactics in his last battle, and
those who propose to study the case should certainly
peruse what he wrote.
The criticism of Nelson’s procedure at Trafalgar
in its strongest form may be summarised as follows.
It is affirmed that he drew up and communicated to
the officers under his orders a certain plan of attack;
that just before the battle he changed his plan without
warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily;
that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and,
because of all this, that the British loss was much
heavier and much less evenly distributed among the
ships of the fleet than it need have been. The
most formidable arraignment of the mode of Nelson’s
last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper
published by Sir Charles Ekins in his book on ‘Naval
Battles,’ and vouched for by him as the work
of an eye-witness—almost certainly, as
Mr. Julian Corbett holds, an officer on board the Conqueror
