“I stated to him,” says General Halleck, “that the object of my visit was to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future operations.  He said that he proposed to cross the James River at that point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy’s communications by that route South, making no further demonstration for the present against Richmond.  I stated to him very frankly my views in regard to the manner and impracticability of the plan;” and nothing further, it seems, was said of this highly “impracticable” plan of operations.  It became practicable afterward under General Grant; McClellan was not permitted to essay it in July, 1862, from the fact that it had been resolved to relieve him from command, or from General Halleck’s inability to perceive its good sense.

General Lee’s views upon this subject coincided completely with those of General McClellan.  He expressed at this time, to those in his confidence, the opinion that Richmond could be assailed to greater advantage from the South, as a movement of the enemy in that direction would menace her communications with the Gulf States; and events subsequently proved the soundness of this view.  Attacks from all other quarters failed, including a repetition by General Grant of McClellan’s attempt from the side of the Chickahominy.  When General Grant carried out his predecessor’s plan of assailing the city from the direction of Petersburg, he succeeded in putting an end to the war.

PART IV.

THE WAR ADVANCES NORTHWARD

I.

LEE’S PROTEST.

General Lee remained in front of Richmond, watching General McClellan, but intelligence soon reached him from the upper Rappahannock that another army was advancing in that quarter, and had already occupied the county of Culpepper, with the obvious intention of capturing Gordonsville, the point of junction of the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central Railroads, and advancing thence upon Richmond.

The great defeat on the Chickahominy had only inspired the Federal authorities with new energy.  Three hundred thousand new troops were called for, large bounties were held out as an inducement to enlistment, negro-slaves in regions occupied by the United States armies were directed to be enrolled as troops, and military commanders were authorized to seize upon whatever was “necessary or convenient for their commands,” without compensation to the owners.  This indicated the policy upon which it was now intended to conduct the war, and the army occupying Culpepper proceeded to carry out the new policy in every particular.