Still it seemed that the Federal commander was unable to come to the mortifying resolution of recrossing the Rappahannock.  The battle was fought on the 13th of December, and until the night of the 15th General Burnside continued to face Lee on the south bank of the river—­his bands playing, his flags flying, and nothing indicating an intention of retiring.  To that resolve he had however come, and on the night of the 15th, in the midst of storm and darkness, the Federal army recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock.

XI FINAL MOVEMENTS OF 1862

The battle of Fredericksburg was another defeat of the Federal programme of invasion, as decisive, and in one sense as disastrous, as the second battle of Manassas.  General Burnside had not lost as many men as General Pope, and had not retreated in confusion, pursued by a victorious enemy; but, brief as the conflict had been—­two or three hours summing up all the real fighting—­its desperate character, and the evident hopelessness of any attempt to storm Lee’s position, profoundly discouraged and demoralized the Northern troops.  We have quoted the statement of General Franklin, commanding the whole left wing, that from “the demoralized condition of the troops upon the right and centre, as represented to him by their commanders, he believed the order to recross was a very proper one.”  Nor is there any ground to suppose that the feeling of the left wing was greatly better.  That wing of the army had not suffered as heavily as the right, which had recoiled with such frightful slaughter from Marye’s Hill; but the repulse of General Meade in their own front had been equally decisive, and the non-success of the right must have reacted on the left, discouraging that also.  Northern writers, in a position to ascertain the condition of the troops, fully bear out this view:  “That the morale of the Army of the Potomac became seriously impaired after the disaster at Fredericksburg,” says Mr. Swinton, the able and candid historian of the campaign, “was only too manifest.  Indeed, it would be impossible to imagine a graver or gloomier, a more sombre or unmusical body of men than the Army of the Potomac a month after the battle.  And, as the days went by, despondency, discontent, and all evil inspirations, with their natural consequent, desertion, seemed to increase rather than to diminish, until, for the first time, the Army of the Potomac could be said to be really demoralized.”  General Sumner noticed that a spirit of “croaking” had become diffused throughout the forces.  For an army to display that tendency clearly indicates that the troops have lost the most important element of victory—­confidence in themselves and their leader.  And for this sentiment there was valid reason.  Columns wholly inadequate in numbers had been advanced against the formidable Confederate positions, positions so strong and well defended that it is doubtful if thrice the