for they would console themselves with the hope of winning a subsequent match.  But to us, who regard war as a hateful necessity, from which we do not shrink, but which we did everything in our power to avert—­to us there can be no thought of relinquishing our task, until there is a reasonable prospect of a really lasting settlement.  We should need no prompting from our statesmen to realise that this must be “a fight to a finish.”  There must be no reversion to the status quo, that accursed device of a worn-out diplomacy, with its inevitable seeds of new quarrels and yet another Armageddon.

Public Law, Nationality, and a general reduction of armaments (as distinguished from complete disarmament) are the three foundation stones of the new era, as already envisaged in the public utterances of those who have some right to speak for the Triple Entente.  Let us then endeavour to apply these principles to the various problems raised by the war.  It is obvious that their application depends upon the victory of the Allies.  If we are defeated, public law will have lost its value, for the Germans will have asserted their right to violate its fundamental provisions.  The idea of Nationality will have received its death-blow; for not only will the independence of several of the smaller nations have been destroyed, but Germany will have reasserted her right to dominate her own minor nationalities, and to drain the life-blood of the 26 million Slavs of Austria-Hungary in a conflict with their own Slavonic kinsmen.  Finally, all hope of reduced armaments will have been exploded, since the theory of Blood and Iron will have attained its fullest expression in the virtual domination of a single power on land and sea.  Regrets or misgivings we may have, but the time for their utterance has long since passed.  The British nation must have no illusions; defeat means the downfall of the Empire, and the reduction of Britain to the position of a second-rate power.  Either we shall emerge victorious, or for all practical purposes we shall not emerge at all.  Even if we shrink from a “fight to a finish,” our enemies can be relied upon to persist to the bitter end.  It is for this reason only, and not because I underestimate for a moment the vast resources, the splendid organisation, the military valour of Germany, that I restrict myself in the following pages to a consideration of the possible effects of victory rather than of defeat.  It would be the height of folly to anticipate victory before it is achieved; but it is essential that we should be prepared for all possible contingencies, and this involves a careful survey of the various factors in an extraordinarily complicated situation.