intuitive moralists erroneously supposed to be possessed by mankind at large.  There needs but a continuance of absolute peace externally and a rigorous insistence on non-aggression internally, to insure the moulding of men into a form naturally characterized by all the virtues.  This general induction is re-enforced by especial induction.  Now as displaying this high trait of nature, now as displaying that, Mr. Spencer has instanced various uncivilized peoples who, inferior to us in other respects, are morally superior to us.  He has also pointed out that such peoples are, one and all, free from inter-tribal antagonisms.  The peoples showing this connection between external and internal peacefulness on the one hand, and superior morality on the other, are of various races.  In the Indian Hills are found some who are by origin Mongolian, Kelarian, Dravidian; in the forests of Malacca, Burma, and in secluded parts of China exist such tribes of yet other bloods; in the East Indian archipelago are some belonging to the Papuan stock; in Japan there are the amiable Ainos, who have no traditions of internecine strife; and in North Mexico exists yet another such people unrelated to the rest, the Pueblos.  Our author holds that no more conclusive proof could be wished than that supplied by these isolated groups of men, who, widely remote in locality and differing in race, are alike in the two respects that circumstances have long exempted them from war, and that they are now organically good.  May we not reasonably infer, asks Mr. Spencer, in conclusion, that the state reached by these small, uncultured tribes may be reached by the great cultured nations, when the life of internal amity shall be unqualified by the life of external enmity?

We bring to an end our review of the “Synthetic Philosophy” by pointing out that the ethical doctrine constituting the culmination of the system which is set forth in the “Principles of Ethics” is fundamentally a corrected and elaborated version of the doctrine propounded in “Social Statics” issued as long ago as 1850.  The correspondence between the two works is shown not only by the coincidence of their constructive divisions, but also by the agreement of their cardinal ideas.  As in the one, so in the other, Man, in common with lower creatures, is held to be capable of indefinite change by adaptation to conditions.  In both he is regarded as undergoing transformation from a nature appropriate to his aboriginal wild life, to a nature appropriate to a settled civilized life; and in both this transformation is described as a moulding into a form fitted for harmonious co-operation.  In both works, too, this moulding is said to be effected by the repression of certain primitive traits no longer needed, and the development of needful traits.  As in the first work, so in this last, the great factor in the progressive modification is shown to be sympathy.  It was contended in “Social Statics,” as it is contended in the “Principles of Ethics,”