a witness will scarce be able to find belief.  As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there.  To which the king replied, hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as A sober fair man, but now I am sure you lie.

6.  Probable arguments capable of great Variety.

Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition:  and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable.  There is another, I confess, which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than anything else, and that is, the opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more falsehood and error among men, than truth and knowledge.  And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden.  But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place.

CHAPTER XVI.  OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.

1.  Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.

The grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter:  as they are the foundations on which our assent is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated:  only we are to take notice, that, whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes.  I confess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to in the world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them:  it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most, very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace that side of the question.  It suffices that they have once with care and fairness