CHAPTER IX.

Of perception.

1.  Perception the first simple Idea of Reflection.

Perception, as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general.  Though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything.  For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

2.  Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is.

What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any discourse of mine.  Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it.  And if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.

3.  Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression.

This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception.  Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the sense of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind; wherein consists actual perception.

4.  Impulse on the organ insufficient.

How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound?  A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the observation of the mind, there follows no perception:  and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard.  Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man’s ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no sensation.  So that wherever there is sense of perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.

5.  Children, though they may have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate.

Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their senses about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies that environ them, or else of those wants or diseases they suffer; amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two:  which probably are some of the first that children have, and which they scarce ever part with again.