“The legal principle [of the equality of nations], whatever its basis in fact, must be preserved, otherwise force rather than law, the power to act rather than the right to act, becomes the fundamental principle of organization, just as it has been in all previous Congresses and Concerts of the European Powers.

“It appears to me that a positive guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence by the nations would have to rest upon an open recognition of dominant coercive power in the articles of agreement, the power being commercial and economic as well as physical.  The wisdom of entering into such a guaranty is questionable and should be carefully considered before being adopted.

“In order to avoid the recognition of force as a basis and the question of dominant force with the unavoidable classification of nations into ‘big’ and ‘little,’ ‘strong’ and ‘weak,’ the desired result of a guaranty might be attained by entering into a mutual undertaking not to impair the territorial integrity or to violate the political sovereignty of any state.  The breach of this undertaking would be a breach of the treaty and would sever the relations of the offending nation with all other signatories.”

I have given these two extracts from my notes in order to show the views that I held, at the time the American Commission was about to depart from the United States, in regard to the character of the guaranty which the President intended to make the central feature of the League of Nations.  In the carrying out of his scheme and in creating an organization to give effect to the guaranty I believed that I saw as an unavoidable consequence an exaltation of force and an overlordship of the strong nations.  Under such conditions it would be impossible to preserve within the organization the equality of nations, a precept of international law which was the universally recognized basis of intercourse between nations in time of peace.  This I considered most unwise and a return to the old order, from which every one hoped that the victory over the Central Empires had freed the world.

The views expressed in the notes quoted formed the basis for my subsequent course of action as an American Commissioner at Paris in relation to the League of Nations.  Convinced from previous experience that to oppose every form of guaranty by the nations assembled at Paris would be futile in view of the President’s apparent determination to compel the adoption of that principle, I endeavored to find a form of guaranty that would be less objectionable than the one which the President had in mind.  The commitment of the United States to any guaranty seemed to me at least questionable, though to prevent it seemed impossible in the circumstances.  It did not seem politic to try to persuade the President to abandon the idea altogether.  I was certain that that could not be done.  If he could be induced to modify his plan so as to avoid a direct undertaking to protect other nations from aggression, the result would be all that could be expected.  I was guided, therefore, chiefly by expediency rather than by principle in presenting my views to the President and in openly approving the idea of a guaranty.