The Crisis of the Naval War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 268 pages of information about The Crisis of the Naval War.

The Crisis of the Naval War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 268 pages of information about The Crisis of the Naval War.
if it resulted in increased rapidity of production.  It will be readily understood that such an immense change in organization, one which I had promised to see through personally, and which was naturally much disliked by all the Admiralty departments, threw a vast volume of extra work on my shoulders, work which had no connexion with the operations of war, and this too at a period when the enemy’s submarine campaign was at its height.  I should not have undertaken it but for the hope that the change would result in greatly increased production, particularly of warships and merchant ships.

The success of this new organization can only be measured by the results obtained, and by this standard, if it were possible to eliminate some of the varying and incalculable factors, we should be able to judge the extent to which the change was justified.  It was a change for which, under pressure, I bore a large share of responsibility, and it involved replacing, in the middle of a great war, an organization built up by experts well acquainted with naval needs by one in which a considerable proportion of the personnel had no previous experience of the work.  The change was, of course, an experiment; the danger lay in the fact that, until technical and Admiralty experience has been gained, even men of the greatest ability in other walks of life may find it difficult to produce satisfactory results even if there are no limits imposed on the size of the Staff which assists them.

The question of production is best examined under various headings and the results under the old Admiralty organization compared with those under the new, although comparison is admittedly difficult owing to changing conditions.

WARSHIP PRODUCTION

Under the Admiralty organization existing up to May, 1917, the Third Sea Lord—­as the Controller was termed when changes were introduced by Mr. Churchill in 1912—­was head of the Departments of the Director of Naval Construction and Engineer in Chief, and of that part of the work of the Director of Naval Ordnance which dealt with the design and production of guns and gun mountings.  Under the new organization a civilian Controller became responsible for production, the Third Sea Lord being associated with him on technical matters of design.

A special department for warship production and repairs was set up under a Deputy Controller, the Third Sea Lord having no authority over this department except by his association with the Controller.

Under the old organization it had been the custom during the war for the Third Sea Lord to give to the Board and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet a personal forecast of the anticipated dates of completion of all warships under construction.  My experience whilst in command of the Grand Fleet had been that this personal forecast was generally fairly accurate for six months ahead.

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The Crisis of the Naval War from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.