Interrogation

in criminal law, process of questioning by which police obtain evidence. The process is largely outside the governance of law except for rules concerning the admissibility at trial of confessions obtained through interrogation and limitations on the power of police to detain suspected persons against their will. See also confession.

In the United States relatively elaborate safeguards have been placed on the interrogatory powers of the police. In Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) and Miranda v.

Arizona (q.v.), (1966), the Supreme Court required that the police inform a suspected person of his right to remain silent and of his right to have legal counsel present at his interrogation. These decisions were criticized as having achieved questionable safeguards of suspected persons' rights at great detriment to law enforcement. Some commentators pointed out that similar restrictions could not be found in the legal procedures of other countries. Most agreed that in Escobedo and Miranda, the Supreme Court stretched the constitutional requirements of right to counsel and freedom from self-incrimination for the purpose of achieving social justice for indigent defendants.

In Great Britain interrogation is regulated by the “judges' rules.” If an officer has sufficient evidence that an offense has been committed, he must caution the suspect. After a suspect has been formally charged, he must be cautioned again before further questioning can take place. Continental European countries give their police far greater freedom to question suspects, but the power to hold a person on suspicion is limited in much the same manner as in Anglo-American countries. See also arrest; search and seizure.