In the following essay, Immerman puts forth evidence which questions the conventional view that Dulles dominated the president in his foreign policy decision-making during the Eisenhower administration.

In the following essay, Mulder investigates the religious and moral sources of Dulles's approach to international affairs.

In the following essay, Morgenthau examines Dulles's role as Secretary of State in relation to several factors, including Congress, the President, and general public opinion. Overall, Morgenthau argues that Dulles's work was essentially a continuation of his predecessors' foreign policies, and was aimed at maintaining the status quo while appearing to be innovative.

In the following essay, Pruessen undertakes a survey of Dulles's actions and policymaking as U. S. Secretary of State. Pruessen maintains that Dulles's intellectual achievements far outnumbered his practical ones, and that his diplomatic endeavors in Europe proved much more successful than those in Asia, the Middle East, or Latin America.

In the following essay, Challener and Fenton use Dulles's correspondence and the taped recollections of his friends and colleagues to present a more complicated view of Dulles than the common stereotype of him as a one-dimensional, Christian anti-communist.

In the following essay, Herring and Immerman suggest that Dulles and Eisenhower had offered "a massive air strike to relieve the Vietminh siege of the French fortress at Dienbienphu" in 1954, thus bringing the United States close to war in Southeast Asia a decade before large-scale U.S. military involvement in Vietnam began.

In the following essay, originally delivered as a lecture in 1964, Craig surveys Dulles's qualifications and tenure as secretary of state. While acknowledging Dulles's faults, such as occasional lapses of precision or tact, Craig emphasizes his successes and particularly grants him "credit for the recovery of western unity and will."

In the following essay, Dingman discusses the successes and limitations of Dulles's involvement in the creation of SEATO, an organization that Dulles largely envisioned as designed to check possible communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

In the following essay, Holsti evaluates the largely negative assessment of Dulles presented in Townsend Hoopes's The Devil and John Foster Dulles, as well as other contemporary accounts, by comparing Dulles's record as secretary of state to that of Henry Kissinger.

In the following essay, originally delivered as an address before the National War College at Washington in 1953, Dulles outlines the mechanisms of Soviet power and ideology, which, he contends, may be defeated by the "supremacy of moral law."

In the following essay, originally published in 1959, Nixon honors Dulles for his firmness, integrity, and skill in negotiating foreign policy as United States Secretary of State.

In the following review, Rapp argues that Dulles's general thoughts on sustaining world peace and containing communist expansion as outlined in War or Peace are "more important than his specific recommendations."

In the following review, Rauch calls War or Peace a "primer for Everyman" that asserts "the primacy of moral issues in international affairs," but nevertheless observes that the work occasionally fails to surmount Republican partisanism.

In the following review, Fox summarizes the argument of Dulles's War or Peace, calling it "a sensible book which ought to be widely read."