SOURCE: “Psychology from the Phenomenological Standpoint of Husserl,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, June, 1976, pp. 451-71.

In the following essay, Golomb explains the distinctions Husserl makes between psychology and psychologism, and between positivistic and phenomenological psychology, and analyzes the significance of these differences in the development of phenomenology and for the practice of psychology.

A. Introduction

The title of this paper, [“Psychology from the Phenomenological Standpoint of Husserl”] which recalls the title of Brentano's major work,¹ implies an attempt to examine the relations between phenomenology and psychology from a single, consistent standpoint. Technical limitations apart, this is impossible in principle since it is difficult to find one consistent standpoint in Husserl's works. Ricoeur² and Farber³, for instance, specify four stages in Husserl's thought to which the Hegelian term Aufhebung can be applied. In developing his thinking, Husserl tends to eliminate some of his previous ideas...